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THE DISCHARGE OF LIENS BY JUDICIAL SALE IN
PENNSYLVANIA.
It is a familiar principle that a judicial sale of real property
discharges liens, but not estates or interests therein-a principle
founded on the experience that by such judicial action a better
price is obtained for the property sold. with a consequent gain to
the distributees of the proceeds. 2 In applying this rule, the ques-
tion has sometimes arisen what estate or interest is covered by the
rule. Thus dower both at connon law and under the intestate
law is an estate in the land and not a mere lien,3 which terminates
with tle widow's death. 4 Likewise a widow's interest in her hus-
band's real estate. charged on the part accepted by one of the
heirs, is an estate. and is not divested by a sale under a subse-
quent encumbrance,3 though the rule is otherwise should the
widow (lie between the levy and the sale.( Likewise an easement
in land is not extinguished by a sheriff's sale of the servient tene-
ment, though at one time the two properties were vested in the
same owner, if the ownership he apparent and continuous.
7 Like-
wise an interest in land acquired by a railroad company for the
use of its business is an easement, an estate which cannot be dis-
'Western Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Johnston, 59 Pa. 29o. 294 (1869).
'Presbyterian Congregation v. Wallace, 3 Rawle, iog (1831).
'Diefenderfer v. Eshleman. 113 Pa. 3o5 (7886); Porter v. Lazear, 14
W. X. C. 261 (1883): Luther v. WVagner, 107 Pa. .343 0884); Zeigler's
Appeal, T Chester Co. 51t (1874). Says Judge Weand in Firman v. Hoben-
sack. 14 Pa. Dist. Rep. 537 (19o4): "The interest which A takes in this State
in lieu of her dower at common law is an interest in land, and not a mere
charge or lien, and the character of her interest is not changed by the
Act of March 29. 1832. P. L. 19o. which prescribes the form of ascer-
taining and assigning it. and changes somewhat the method of its use and
enjoyment." Kunselnian v. Stine, 192 Pa. 462 (1899).
'Grove's Appeal. 103 Pa. _62 (1883) ; Firman v. Hobensack, 14 Pa. Dist.
Rep. 537 (i9o4) ; Commonwealth v. Snyder, i Del. Co. 404 (882).
" Fisher v. Kean. i Watts. 2zg (1832) ; .Mentzer v. M6fenor, 8 Watts, 296
(1839) : Vandever v. Baker, 13 Pa. 1i (1849).
'Riddle's Appeal. 37 Pa. 177 (1860).
'Kieffer v. Inhoff. A6 Pa. 438 (18;6): Worne v. Marsh. 6 Phila. 33
(1865); Church v. Vonneida, 6 Phila. 557 (1868).(490)
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charged by judicial sale.8 The rights of the corporation may in-
deed pass to another, but "subject to the constitutional right of
the owner of the legal estate in the land". A judicial sale there-
fore does not divest the title of the owner in the land.9 Conse-
quently one's interest or estate in land which has been appropri-
ated by a railroad company under appropriate proceedings, for
which he has not been paid, is not divested by the judicial sale of
the property and franchises of the company under a decree of
foreclosure of the first mortgage.10
From the operation of this rule two classes of cases have
been excepted; one class, and the more recent, by legislative en-
actment; 1 the other class in which the divestiture would work
manifest injury. The cases falling under the older rule have
been thus classified: (i) liens created by wills as permanent
provision for wives and children; (2) liens or encumbrances that
will not readily admit of valuation; (3) liens that were plainly
intended to run with the land ;12 (4) liens under the control of
the court.
Only a few cases falling under the older rule are found in
the reports. Very often legacies have been declared to be a
charge on land," but the lien thereby created has usually been
discharged by its sale. If the legacy is due at the time of the sale,
the lien is discharged and the legatee must look to the proceeds
for the payment;" only in the few cases in which the legacy is
not due at the time of the sale does the lien continue. 14 And the
'Martin v. Pittsburgh Southern R. Co., 28 Pitts. L. J. (0. S.) i56 (i88o).
'Buffalo, New York & Phila. R. Co. v. Harvey, T07 Pa. 319 (1884);
Western Pa. R. Co. v. Johnston, 59 Pa. 29o (1869); Gilmore Y. Pittsburgh,
Va. & Charleston R. Co.. 1o4 Pa. 275 (i884); Philadelphia, Newtown &
N. Y. R. Co. v. Cooper, io5 Pa. 239 (1884).
"Buffalo, New York & Phila. R. Co. Y. Harvey, 107 Pa. 319 (1884).
Act April 6. 183o. P. L. :.93, 1 Purd., § 167, p. 1383.
"Heister v. Green. 48 Pa. 96. io2 (1864) ; Stewartson v. Uratts, 8 Watts,
392 (1839): Washburn's Estate. 187 Pa. 162 (1898); Herr v. Groff, 17 Pa.
Dist. Rep. 478 (19o8) ; Eckert's Estate, x57 Pa. 585 (1893) ; Schnure's Appeal,
70 Pa. 400 (1872): Hodgson v. Gemmil, 5 Rawle, 99 (1835); Stone v. Massey,
2 Yeates, 363 (1798). See Moran's Estate, 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 351 (190o).
"Lobach's Case, 6 Watts, 16,- (1837) ; McLanahan v. Wyant, i P. & IV.
96 (i8-9): Helnan v. Hellman, 4 Rawle, 44o (1834); Hanna's Appeal, 31
Pa. 53 (18.57) l)rake v. lBrown. 68 Pa. 223 (1871).
"Hiester v. Green. 48 Pa. 96 (1864); Hartzell's Estate, 188 Pi. 384
(1898); \'alter's Estate, 197 Pa. 555 (igor).
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same principle applies to a legacy payable in installments.
5 Thus
a testator bequeathed a legacy to his son in trust for his grandson
to be paid to him between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five
at the son's discretion. This legacy was charged on certain real
estate. It was provided that if the grandson died before reach-
ing twenty-five, the legacy was to lapse. Before the grandson
reached twenty-one. the land was s.old by the sheriff. When the
grandson became of age the son declared in writing that the leg-
acy was payable. The court held that the owners of the land
were bound to pay the legacy with interest, for the lien ran with
the land and was not discharged by its sale.'
Although an estate, a (lower interest for example, cannot be
divested by a sale,' the arrears of dower can he discharged by
such action. 8 Thus a recognizance had been given in the Or-
phans' Court, in accordance with the statute, as a substitute for
a widow's dower interest. The land was sold but the interest
which ought to have been paid to the widow accumulated: and
none was paid for a year and nine months. It was held that the
property was discharged by the sale from the lien for the year's
interest due and in arrear: but not from the lien of the nine
months" interest not yet due, "because." said Mr. Justice Trunkey,
"the widow's estate is not a lien, and the rent or interest in the
nature of rent, which had not become due before the sale, re-
mains as part of her estate. It has been often ruled that by such
sale the lien of arrears due the widow is divested, but there is
not even a dictum that the accruing interest not due at the time
of the sale does not continue the lien.
' "
In the case of Tospon v. Snipe*
2- an interesting distinction is
drawn between arrears of dower and arrears of interest on land
,Ibid.
"Dewart's Ap cal, 43 Pa. 325 (1862); Schnure's Appeal, 70 Pa. 400
(1872).
,, Scbais App -al. V0 Pa. 17o o86i), overruling Kurtz's Appeal. 26 Pa.
465 (186): Helf ich v. Weaver. 61 Pa. 385 (i86j); Swar's Appeal, 
r Pa.
C02 (1845); Zeiglers Appeal. 35 Pa. t73 (,x6o); Mentzer v. Menor, 8 Watts,
2-)6 (18.39): Fishr v. Kean. I WVatts. 259 (1832).
' Dickin on . Beyer. 87 Pa. 274 (1878); Plumer's Appeal. ti W. N. C.
144 (M8S1): Luther v. Wagner, 1o7 Pa. 343 (1884).
" Luther v. Wagner. 1o7 Pa. 343 (1884).
30 iz6 Pa. 58 (1887).
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bound by a mortgage on which judgment has been obtained. The
court remarked that as a general rule the sheriff's sale of land
bound by a mortgage on a judgment obtained for arrears of in-
terest clue on the mortgage debt divested the lien of the mortgage
even though the principal debt was not yet due. "The reason is
that the interest is a part of the debt and no distinction can be
taken between a judgment for the interest and a judgment for the
principal." This reason cannot be applied in the case of arrear-
ages of interest due as dower. "because there is not, and cannot
be, an identity of interest and principal..2 ' The interest belongs
alone to the widow; the principal belongs alone to the heirs and
they cannot have it until after her death. She has not and never
can have any right or title to any part of the principal, and hence
a judgment for the interest is in no sense a judgment for the
principal or any part of it. It is not due to the.same persons nor
in the same right, and cannot be considered as identified with it,
either in fact or in legal contemplation."
If the lien is plainly intended to run with the land, it con-
tines notwithstanding the sale. In Blank v. Kline22 a husband
and wife conveyed land charged with the payment of the legal in-
terest of a surn of money to the grantor and his wife during their
joint lives, and to her during her life if she survived her husband.
On the same day the land was reconveyed to the husband subject
to the same charge and subsequently the land was sold by the
sheriff. Several years afterward they were divorced. The lien
was not divested by the sheriff's sale nor by the divorce and ex-
tended to every part of the land conveyed: she could therefore
collect the entire interest from the present owner of the land.
But the words must be clear and express to create such an
intention. -3 A recital therefore onl the face of a deed that the
purchase money remains unpaid and is to be paid annually is not
enough to create such a lien. Thus a widow to whom was de-
vised during her widowhood the use of a lot, released it to the
devisee's son, who had the remaining interest therein, in con-
West Branch Bank v. Chester. ii Pa. 282 (849).
,2 *. Pa. 613 (1893).
SHiester v. Green, 48 Pa. 96 (1864); Rohn v. Odenwalder0 x62 Pa. 346
ti894).
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sideration of the payment to her of an annuity.yearly. She did
not however express in the conveyance any intention to charge
the anuity as a lien on the land. The court held that the law
would not imply such an intention and consequently none was
thereby created.
2 4
On the other hand a conveyance made by a husband and
wife to their son "under and subject" to the payments of an an-
nual sum to the husband during his life creates a fixed lien which
will run with the land and is not divested by a subsequent sheriff's
sale.2 3  Conveyances of this nature are sustained.26 In these
cases the charge or lien runs with the land because this is the clear
intent of the parties to the conveyance; and the lien must be con-
tinued in order to carry out that intention, as in providing for the
annual panent of money during the life of-a son, widow, or
other person. The intention would be defeated by selling the
land and paying a sum to the son or widow. In most cases of
legacies which are a charge on land, the intention of the testator
is executed by the payment of the specified amount at or within
the time specified, and no intention is frustrated by the sale of-the
land and the payment of the proceeds or the proper amount to the
legatee. Consequently a direction in a will subjecting land to the
payment of a legacy, while clearly creating a lien, does not en-
(low it with a permanent quality without some additional state-
ment that the payment is to e continued for several years or dur-
ing the life of the legatee, or is for an indeterminate amount. In
other words, there must be some condition or requirement that
cannot be satisfied by the sale of the land and payment of the
money without disregarding the intention of the testator.
In cases that fall within the former class the land can be
sold and the lien discharged by paying the amount designated ;27
in cases falling within the latter class the lien continues notwith-
Hiester Y. Green, 48 Pa. 96 (1864).
sRohn v. Odenwalder, 162 Pa. 346 (1894).
Heist v. Baker, 49 Pa. 9 (1864); Eichelbferger v. Gett,.io4 Pa. 64 (1883).
See Hammond's Estate, 197 Pa. zIg (xgoo)..
" flammond's Estate. 197 Pa. ji9 (l.0b) ; Brandt's Ao'peal, 8 Watts4, 202
(1839) Hoover v. Hoover, S Pa. 331 (1847) ; Cable's Appeal, 91 Pa. 327
(1879); Swoope's Appeal, 27 Pa. 58 (1858); Washburn's Estate, 187 Pa. 162
O8,8).
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standing any sale that may be made. "The rule is," in the words
of Mr. Justice Fell, "that the liens of pecuniary legatees which
are determinate in value are discharged by a sheriff's sale of the
land under a judgment obtained against the devisee unless they
were plainly intended by the testator to be continuing liens."' 28
In IVeiler's Estate 9 the testator gave to his sons all his real
estate "for the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars". It
was provided that after the death of his wife all his personal
property was to be sold, and all debts paid, and the remainder
was to be divided equally between his two children. The sons
accepted the real estate but the valuation money was never paid,
and the land passed to third parties, one's share having been sold
by the sheriff, the other's by an assignee in bankruptcy. It was
held that the acceptance of the real estate was a purchase to take
effect after the widow's death, and the legal title was conditioned
on paynent of the valuation money, the lien for which was not
discharged by the sale of the land.
In Lake's Estate"" the testator provided that his two sons
should get title to his real estate "by paying" some pecuniary
legacies. The land was sold at a sheriff's sale, but the court de-
clared the "legacies unpaid must be maintained as a fixed lien on
the land. The purchasers had constructive notice of the charge
and they were bound to know that it was a lien of such indeter-
minate value that would not be divested by the sheriff's sale. They
will have to pay it therefore when it becomes due. Its value is
incapable of being definitely ascertained, and it was created to
run with the land."
In Lancaster Trust Comnpany v. Gochenatter3' a grantor's
wife refused to sign a deed containing in the habenduin clause a
charge on the property of two hundred dollars, or one-third of
the purchase money, "to be paid to the said grantor, his heirs and
assigns, with interest annually until such time as the principal
"Wasibirn's Estate. 187 Pa. 162, 166 (189g8).
' 12 Lane. . Rev. 123. (1894).
V2 Del. Co. 12 ( N31, citing Cowden's Estate. i Pa. -67 (1845); Heist v.
Baker. 40 Pa. 9 ( 86): Heister v. Green, 48 Pa. 1o2 (1864) ; Helfrich v.
Weaver. 61 Pa. 3rjo (iMg).
' 14 Lane. L Rev. -65 (897).
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stun of two hunldred dollars ,.hould be paid and legally released".
Subsequently the plaintiff, having obtained a judgment against
the grantee. issued an execution thereon and sold the property,
but neither the charge nor the arrears of interest were divested
by the sale. The court remarked that "it is not a statutory lien
or an estate in land, in its terms, and therefore neither it nor the
arrears of interest could be divested by a sheriff's sale".
The same rule is logically applied to an annuity, and it
therefore continues as a charge after the sale of the land. In a
recent case Mr. Justice Brown states that "the only reason why
the future arrears of annuity, payable out of the land of the
widow, have been excepted, is on account of the impossibility of
computing their amount", thus making them fall under the sec-
ond head of the old class of exceptions. "Therefore, as to them,"
he continues, "the purchaser has been held to take the land
chargeable with the future payments."32
This reason, of course, does not apply to arrears that are due
and payable; hence they can be discharged. 3
.\rrearages of ground rent, like those of dower or of an-
nuitv, are discharged by a judicial sale of the property.3 4 The law
is so well settled that the cases on appeal calling for its applica-
tions are rare. In one of these Mr. Justice Trunkey has thus
stated the law :"
"Arrears of ground rent, a lien on the land charged, upon a
judicial sale of the land, are to be paid out of the proceeds. The
owner of the ground rent cannot elect to refuse the money and
continue the lien. When the sheriff makes the sale, he is bound
to appropriate the fund in discharge of the liens in the order of
priority, or pay the money into court." A private sale of the
'Walters v. Steele, 21o Pa. 219, 221 (1904).
'Ibid; Reed v. Reed. I W. & S. 235 (i8g4x); Dickinson v. Beyer,.87 Pa.
274 (1878): Davison's Appeal. 95 Pa. 394 (i88o); Luther v. Wagner, 107
Pa. 343 (1884). A testator gave to his nephew an annuity and "all" of his
personal property to his wife. "We think", said the court, "the intention of
the testator to exempt his personal estate from the payment of this annuity.
and to charge it upon his lands is as clear as if he had expressly so declared
in words". Nathan's Estate, 36 WV. N. C. 185 (1895).
' Sergeant v. Fleckenstein, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 557 (1899); Bantleon v.
Smith. 2 Binn. 146 (i ,) : Pancoast's Appeal, 8 W. & S. 381 (845)'; Mather
v. McMichael, 13 Pa. 3o (1850) ; Fassit v. Middleton, 47 Pa. 214 (1867).
- Foulke v. Millard, 108 Pa. 230, 235 (1885).
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land will not dive.-t liens, and the owner of the ground rent in
.,ome circumstances may prosecute proceedings for collection
without actual notice to the subsequent grantee. The latter
purchases with knowledge of the charges, and often must pro-
tect himself.- A sheriff's sale divests the lien of the rent, no
lien is divested by a private sale."
What is the effect against creditors of making a fraudulent
conveyance of land encumbered with liens? If the land is sold
by the sheriff under a judgment subsequently obtained against
the grantor, the liens existing before the conveyance remain,
and they are not payable from the proceeds of the sale.38  The
estate of the debtor, whatever that may be, is sold under the exe-
cution, and those liens only which attached after the fraudulent
conveyance are payable in their order from the proceeds.3 9
Tax liens, also. in the absence of a statute, are discharged by
judicial sale.'" By the Act of 190, 41 taxes are a first lien on the
property, and have priority in the distribution of the. proceeds
before any other obligation. 42 but, as will be presently seen, the
sale does not divest mortgage liens. The tax liens, however, are
not fixed, permanent, like mortg-ge liens and may be divested, if
the property sells for enough to pay them. 43 Should there be a de-
ficiency, then. in some places, the lien continues for that
amount :44 in others, the lien is divested whether or not the fund
arising from the sale of the land taxed is sufficient to pay the
full amount. ' In Philadelphia, the tax lien is discharged by a
N Mather v. McMiehael, 13 Pa. 301 (i85o).
' Charnley v. Hanshury, 13 Pa. z6 (t85o).
'Fidler v. John. 178 Pa. 112 (8 &6): Hiestand v. Williamson, 128 Pa. 122
(1889). affirming i Xorthanipton Co. 148 (t888): Zaver v. Clark, 104 Pa. 222
(88.) ; Haak's Appeal. loo Pa. ;9 t1882): Byrod's Appeal, 31 .Pa. 241
(j8.8): Fisher's Appeal. 33 Pa. 294 (1859). reversing 3 Phila. 224 (i858);
lioffinan's Appeal. 44 Pa. 9. (862): Dungan's Appeal, 88 Pa. 414 (1879);
Anderson v. Alenorth, 16 W. X. C. 338 (1885).
h1offman's Appeal. 44 Pa. o. (1862): Jacoby's Appeal, 67 Pa. 434 (1871).
'Clinton County v. Harrisburg Trust Co.. 21 Pa. Dist. Rep. 76o (1912).
"Act June 4, P. L 364.
"Clinton County Y. Harrisburg Trust Co.. 21 Pa. Dist. Rep. 76o (1912).
"Act May 28. i9o7, P. L 28o: Clinton County v. Harrisburg Trust Co.,
21 Pa. Dist. Rep. 76o (1912).
"Ibid.
"Pittsburgh v. Wri-ht. ,3 Pa, Diqt. Rep. 723 (1904); At Feb. 27, i860,
P. L. 85; Shaw v. City of llegheny. 115 Pa. 46 (1886).
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sheriff's sale, if the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay
them: if they are not. the lien continues for the unpaid balance. 4a
In 1824' the tax was first made a lien in Philadelphia and con-
tinued until it was paid ;in 1845"" the law required the tax to be
registered in order to continue the lien; the next year, the law re-
quired a suit to be brought within five years after they became
due. otherwise the lien ceased.
4 8
On the judicial sale of land, all judgments in force, whether
against the present or prior owner, divests the lien; and they
must be paid from the purchase money according to priority.4 9
"And if a sheriff's sale of land, subject to the lien of a judgment
be made, pending a scire facias for its revival, the lien of the
judgment is discharged, and it is no consequence to the pur-
chaser whether judgment be subsequently entered against the
defendant, reviving the judgment for its full amount."' On
the other hand, the lien of a judgment is not discharged by the
sale of one of two tenants in common who took subject thereto.al
Likewise, if devised land is subject to the lien of a judgment and
also to the maintenance of the widow, a sale under a judgment
against the devisee will not discharge the widow's lien.5 -
The lien on decedents* estates for debts is not a continuing
one, but is limited by statute. It is true that by the law of Penn-
sylvania, the paramount rights of creditors are regarded, and
distribution among kindred is made only of the residmn
whether of real estate or of personal goods, after the creditors
'Acts of Feb. 3, 1824, P. L i8, March it, 1846, P. L i14; Smith v.
Simpson, 6o Pa. 168 (1869); Philadelphia v. Powers, 214 Pa. 247 (19o6).
"Act Feb. 3, P. L 18, 8 Sm. L. i89; Act April 16, P. L 488.
kAct March ii. P. L. 114; Philadelphia v. Iliester. 142 Pa. 39 (1891);
Philadelphia v. Kates. 150 Pa. 30 (1892). By the General Act of May 4,
18&). P. L 79, the lien was limited to two years unless it was entered of
record, and limited to five years unless revived and continued by writ of
scire facias within that period and duly prosecuted to judgment. See Verona
School District v. McKay, 15 Pa. Dist. Rep. 531 (xgo6).
'Jack v. Jones, 5 Wharton, 321 (184o); Bank of North America v.
Fitzimmons, 3 Bim. 342 (1811) . Custer v. Detterer, 3 W. & S. 28 (84):
Kelhofer v. Herman. 6 Phila. 308 (1867); Commonwealth v. Alexander, 14
S. & R. 257 (1826) ; Stiles v. Bradford, 4 Rawle, 394 (1834).
=Trupkey. J.. Foulke v. Millard, log Pa. 230, 236 (1886).
"Sinclair v. Baker. i Del. Co. 305 (1882).
Mix v. Ackla, 7 Watts, 316 (1838).
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are paid." In the beginning, their lien "remained for an indefi-
nite length of time" until 1797, when their lien was restricted to
seven years, and was reduced to five years by the Act of 1834. Of
late years the legislative tinker has been very busy in changing
the restriction.55
Prior to i83o" the lien effected by a mortgage was dis-
charged by a judicial sale of the property like the other liens al-
ready mentioned. By the act of that year mortgages were made
an exception to the general rule, and the lien was preserved of
mortgages "prior to all other liens upon the same property ex-
cept the mortgages, ground rents, and the purchase money due to
the Commonwealth". This act was a consequence of the deci-
sion in Williard v. Norris" in the previous year, that the pur-
chaser at sheriff's sale of land, subject to a mortgage, sold under
a judgment obtained subsequently to the execution and recording
of the mortgage, took the land discharged of the lien of the
mortgage.
This act, however, partly failed to protect mortgage liens in
Philadelphia because of the Act of 1824,'a giving precedence to
tax liens. This defect was cured by the Act of 1867,19 which
prevented the divestiture of the liens of a mortgage by a sheriff's
sale under a junior encumbrance, both when a municipal claim
had been filed, which, though accruing subsequent to the mort-
gage, had by law been given priority thereto, and 'also when
taxes, charges, or assessments had been filed which accrued sub-
sequent to the mortgage, and had by law been given similar pri-
ority. The law, however, did not prevent the divestiture of the
lien of a mortgage by a sheriff's sale under a junior encum-
brance, when taxes. charges. assessments, or municipal liens had
accrued and claims therefor had been filed prior to the recording
."MclMurra." v. Hopper, 43 Pa. 468 (1862); Homer v. Hasbrouch, 41
Pa. 169 (iS6). See George NV. Biddle's discourse on the lien of the debts
of a decedent before the Law Academy, i834.
"Trevor v. Ellenberger, 2 P. & NV. 94 (1830).
U3 Troubat & Haly's Practice, §§2o3-2o6. p. z'89.
'Act of April 6. P. L. 293, 1 Purd., §167, p. 1183.
o 2 Rawle, 56 (829) ; Fisher v. Connard, too Pa. 63, 68 (r882).
"Act Feb. 3, P. L. t92.
"Act March 23, P. L 44.
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of the mortgage. 0 Therefore a mortgage to the Commonwealth
for purchase money is not divested either by the common law or
by statute by a sheriff's sale.0  Nor is the lien of a prior mort-
gage disturbed by a sheriff's sale under a junior judgment, though
it be entered on the bond accompanying the mortgage ;12 nor is a
coal lease mortgage discharged by a sheriff's sale under execu-
tions on judgments on claims for labor subsequently performed.
Though preferred debts and liens on the funds raised by the
sheriff's sale, the prior mortgage is not thereby divested.62  Nor
is an intervening mortgage discharged which is the first valid en-
cumbrance after a prior mechanics' lien. which is void on its face,
on land sold under a junior judgment. 3 Nor is an unrecorded
mortgage discharged if the land is sold expressly subject thereto,'
of which the purchaser had notice. 4 Again, if a purchase money
mortgage be recorded within sixty days. it is not discharged by
the sheriff's sale; consequently the mortgage is not entitled to
take any of the proceeds. 63 And if two purchase money mort-
gages are given the same day, one of which is subject to the
other, the lien of the latter will not be discharged by a sheriff's
sale under the former.S
Questions have arisen concerning the continuance of the
lien when the mortgagor or his friends have purchased the land
at the sale. Accordingly, it has been decided that when the land
is sold under a judgment and purchased by the judgment cred-
"Fisher v. Connard, zoo Pa. 63 (1882): Rhein Building Association v.
Lea, oo Pa. 21o, decided the same year. The court held that in the city
and county of Philadelphia a sheriffs sale under any junior encumbrance
did not divest the lien of a mortgage even where there had been a claim for
taxes registered prior to the recording of the mortgage. This protection was
given to mortgages by the Acts of April 11, 1835, P. L i9o, and April x6,
184s, §4, P. L 488.
Duncan v. Reiff, 3 P. & NV. 368 (1832).
Commonwealth v. Wilson,. 34 Pa. 63 (1859) ; Cross v. Stahlnan, 43 Pa.
129 (1862), overruling Whitehead v. Purnell, 2 Miles, 434 (1840).
- First Nat. Bank of Mahonoy City v. Sheafer, 149 Pa. 236 (1892).
" Goepp v. Gartiser. 35 Pa. 130 (1859).
MIfuse v. Letterman, 13 S. & R. 167 (1825); Ziegler's Appeal, 35 Pa.
173 (1859); Crooks v. Douglass, 56 Pa. 51 (1867); Ashmead v. McCarthur,
67 Pa. 326 (187 ) ; 8 Vale 23657.
Bratton's Appeal, 8 Pa. 164 (848).
Pease v. Hoag. ti Phila. 549. 32 L 1. 22o (1875) ; Miller v. Fluck, 8
Pa. C. C. 585, 26 W. N. C. 585 (189o).
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itor, by agreement with the mortgagor to reconvey on payment
of his judgment, the equitable estate is never out of the mort-
gagor and the mortgage is not discharged.67 But when the mort-
gage lien has been discharged by a judicial sale to a stranger, it
cannot be revived by the mortgagor's re-acquisition of the title
through the purchaser at the sale.!" Mlr. Justice Green, in com-
menting on the cases in which this rule has been applied, said:
"In both of these cases the purchaser at the judicial sale
was a total stranger to the title and under no obligatioi to pro-
tect the title against any encumbrances. He therefore took the
lands divested of the liens which were sought to be enforced,
and when he subsequently conveyed to the former owner, the
purchaser took the same title which he held."
On the other hand. when a person takes title to land subject
to two mortgages, he cannot at a subsequent sheriff's sale under
the first mortgage purchase the property and hold it divested of
the lien of the second mortgage. ° If this is attempted, the owner
of the second mortgage may obtain redress in equity by obtaining
a decree to continue the lien of his mortgage.' In applying this
rule to the mortgagee and would-be purchaser of the second mort-
gage the court is simply requiring him to observe this well-known
rule, that when the defendant in an execution or the owner of land
whose duty it is to pay prior encumbrances, fails to perform that
duty, by reason of which the land is sold and he himself becomes
the purchaser, he takes in accordance with his former title, and
the second encumbrance, especially if this be a mortgage, is not
discharged." And whenever the defendant has purposely misled
the owner of the second mortgage from appearing at the sheriff's
sale or maintaining his rights, equity will grant relief.73 In
'Good v. Schoener, i Pitts. L J. 82, io L 1. isi (1853).
'Rauch v. Dcch. ji6 Pa. 157 o&97), overruling Cleary vz Kennedy, x6
W. N. C. 313 (88s) : Rushton v. Lippincoft, ng Pa. 12 (i88); Kennedy v.
Boric, 166 Pa. 36o, 364 (1895).
"At page 364.
"Kennedy v. Borie. 166 Pa. 360 (1895).
nlIbid.
"Tavlor v. Smith. 2 Wharton. 432 (1837): Voodburn V. Bank. $ NV. &
S. 447 (1843); Good v. Schoener, io L 1. i15 (1853): Cleary v. Kennedy,
16 W. X. C. 313 (1885) ; Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 299 (i865).
"Kennedy v. Boric, 166 Pa. 36o (1895).
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Saunders v. Gould74 the land sold at sheriff's sale was bid off by
the attorney of the execution defendant in good faith for the pro-
tection of his interests, though the deed was taken by a third
person who advanced the money and who was to reconvey on
payment to him of the money thus advanced. The transaction
was declared to be valid, the lien was discharged. and no ques-
tion was raised about its continuance. In the recent case of the
Equitable Building and Loan Association v. Thomas"' a nort-
gage was given on a tract of land that was subsequently divided
and became the property of two different owners. The portion
belonging to one of them was sold on a judgment which was
junior to the lien of the mortgage covering the entire tract. The
owner of the mortgage of the entire tract purchased the land at
sheriff's sale. It was held that the purchase satisfied the mort-
gage on his own land only, but did not satisfy that on his neigh-
bor's.
'Whien a husband and wife are seized by entireties and the
husband survives, a sheriff's sale on a judgment against the hus-
band will discharge a mortgage executed by both after the entry
of judgment. The reasoning of the court by Mr. Justice Green is:
"As against the wife, the mortgage was undoubtedly the
first and indeed the only lien. As against the husband, the
judgment was the first lien and the mortgage the second, sim-
ply because the judgment was obtained before the mortgage
was given. Had the wife survived, the mortgage would cer-
tainly have had precedence to the exclusion of the judgment,
because the estate bound by the lien of the judgment was de-
feasible by the death of the husband before the wife. For the
same reason, if the husband survived the wife, the estate of the
latter was divested, and the mortgage only became operative
against the husband because he had joined ii its execution. But
as to him, it was not the first lien, he having become subject to a
judgment at a tirfie anterior to the giving of the mortgage."
7'4
1r24 Pa. 237 (189).
Equitable Building & Loan Association v. Thomas, 216 Pa. 571 (19o7).
Fleck v. Zillhauer, 117 Pa. 213 (1887).
Merriman v. Richardson, 5 W. N. C. 9 (1878).
"Cook v. Neal, 6 Montg. Co., 147, 176 (189o).
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A lien award does not become a lien until it is actually filed.
Its existence therefore does not operate to discharge a mortgage
given between the date of the award and the time of filing it."7
Likewise a mortgage preceded by a defective mechanics' lien is
not discharged by a sale under a subsequent encumbrance.-8
Again, if the first lien is a mortgage and the second is a mechan-
ics' lien and the property is sold under a subsequent judgment, the
mortgage is not divested by the sale; nor is oral evidence admis-
sible to show that the lien antedated the mortgage. 9 But if the
mortgage recites the existence of buildings on the premises, and
mechanics' claims have been filed subsequent to the date of tie
mortgage, showing on their face that materials and work were
furnished for the buildings prior to the date of the mortgage, a
purchaser may assume that the lien will be discharged by the
sale.
8 0
If a corporation which has issued bonds is reorganized, is the
lien of the bonds thereby discharged, or does it continue? On
one occasion the franchises of a corporation were sold by virtue
of a judgment and execution subject to a mortgage to secure
bonds. It was reorganized under the same name and creditors
obtained judgment against the original corporation and pro-
ceeded to execution and sale of its property. The court held that
the first sale extinguished the original corporation; that the sec-
ond sale therefore was a nullity and did not divest the lien of the
mortgage.81
On what record of the mortgage may the purchaser rely in
purchasing? If a purchaser has actual notice of an unrecorded
mortgage, he is not at liberty to disregard it.-" But generally he
is not bound to look into the actual facts of payment or the in-
IHillard v. Tusten. 172 Pa. 354 ('895); Wheelock v. Harding, 4 Pa.
Super. Ct. 21 (1897). See Reading v. Hopson, 90 Pa. 494 (1879).
"Reynolds v. Miller, 177 Pa. 168 (1897).
'" Reynolds v. Crindge, r Pa. Dist. Rep. 693 (1892).
"Muse v. Letterman. 13 S. & R. 167 (1825); Stackpole v. Glassford, i6
S. & R. 163 (1827). Twelves v. Williams, 3 Wharton. 485 (1838); Tower's
Appropriation. 9 W. & S..io3 (1845); Towers v. Tuscarora Academy, 8 Pa.
297 (1848). For additional cases see note 45-
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tentions of the parties further than they have been made accessi-
ble to him in the record." In Saunders v. Gould, Mr. Justice
Clark remarked:
-A purchaser is not bound to look beyond the'record. Tile
payment of a prior lien not satisfied of record will not protect a
subsequent mortgage froni being discharged by sale. ' '8 4
Nor does the agency through which the sale is effected change
the law."
How do mistakes in conveyances of the names of parties af-
fect liens on the land conveyed? A conveyance was made to a
man by a wrong name, by which he subsequently mortgaged the
land. Subsequently it was sold on a judgment obtained against
him by his proper !aiae in the interval between the conveyance
and the mortgage. It was held that while the plaintiff was en-
titled to the proceeds, the mortgage was a paramount lien and
was not disturbed by the sale.6 Again, on a scire facias sur mort-
gage, which was a lien on several properties, the prothonotary by
mistake omitted one of them. The judgment and sale did not dis-
charge the lien of the mortgage on the one omitted.8 7
Albert S. Bolles.
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